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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No. 890273-CA 
v. s 
HARVEY DORTON, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from an order of the district court 
denying his Motion to Set Aside Sentence, Judgment, and 
Commitment and bases this appeal on Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-
26(2)(b) (Supp. 1989), which provides that an appeal may be taken 
from an order made, after judgment, affecting the substantial 
rights of the defendant, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 
1989), which provides that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction 
over orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over 
which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction. The order was entered by the Honorable Leonard H. 
Russon, Judge, Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, on October 3, 1988. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether this Court should entertain defendant's 
appeal which is based on an untimely motion to set aside a 
judgment? 
2. Whether defendant's convictions for aggravated 
burglary, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery are 
appropriately based upon separate acts, or are barred because 
they arose from a single criminal episode or are lesser-included 
offenses of one another? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-202 (1978): 
76-6-202. Burglary— 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he 
enters or remains unlawfully in a building or 
any portion of a building with intent to 
commit a felony or theft or commit an assault 
on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third 
degree unless it was committed in a dwelling, 
in which event it is a felony of the second 
degree. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-203 (1978) (amended 1989): 
76-6-203. Aggravated Burglary— 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated 
burglary if in attempting, committing, or 
fleeing from a burglary, the actor or another 
participant in the crime: 
(a) Causes physical injury to any 
person who is not a participant in the 
crime; or 
(b) Uses or threatens the immediate use 
of a dangerous or deadly weapon against 
any person who is not a participant in the 
crime; or 
(c) Is armed with a deadly weapon or 
possesses or attempts to use any explosive 
or deadly weapon. 
(2) Aggravated burglary is a felony of the 
first degree. 
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Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-301 (1978): 
76-6-301. Robbery— 
(1) Robbery is the unlawful and 
intentional taking of personal property in 
the possession of another from his person, or 
immediate presence, against his will, 
accomplished by means of force. 
(2) Robbery is a felony of the second 
degree. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-302 (1978) (amended 1989): 
76-6-302. Aggravated Robbery— 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if 
in the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a 
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife 
or a deadly weapon; or 
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon 
another. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of the 
first degree. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act 
shall be deemed to be "in the course of 
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an 
attempt to commit, during the commission of, 
or in the immediate flight after the attempt 
or commission of a robbery. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-301 (1978) (amended 1983): 
76-5-301. Kidnaping— 
(1) A person commits kidnaping when he 
intentionally or knowingly and without 
authority of law and against the will of the 
victim: 
(a) Detains or restrains another for 
any substantial period; or 
(b) Detains or restrains another in 
circumstances exposing him to risk of 
serious bodily injury; or 
(c) Holds another in involuntary 
servitude; or 
(d) Detains or restrains a minor 
without consent of its parent or guardian. 
(2) Kidnaping is a felony of the third 
degree. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-302 (1978) (amended 1983): 
76-5-302. Aggravated kidnaping— 
(1) A person commits aggravated kidnapping 
when he intentionally or knowingly, by force, 
threat or deceit, detains or restrains 
another against his will with intent: 
(a) To hold for ransom or reward, or 
as a shield or hostage, or to compel a 
third person to engage in particular 
conduct or to forbear from engaging in 
particular conduct; or 
(b) To facilitate the commission, 
attempted commission, or flight after 
commission or attempted commission of a 
felony; or 
(c) To inflict bodily injury on or to 
terrorize the victim or another; or 
(d) To interfere with the performance 
of any governmental or political 
function. 
(2) A detention or moving is deemed to be 
the result of force, threat, or deceit if the 
victim is mentally imcompetent or younger 
than sixteen years and the detention or 
moving is accomplished without the effective 
consent of the victim's custodial parent, 
guardian, or person acting in loco parentis 
to the victim. 
(3) Aggravated kidnaping is a capital 
felony unless the actor voluntarily releases 
the victim alive and in a safe place before 
trial, in which event aggravated kidnaping is 
a felony of the first degree. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-402 (1978): 
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of 
single criminal episode—included offenses— 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a 
single criminal action for all separate 
offenses arising out of a single criminal 
episode; however, when the same act of a 
defendant under a single criminal episode 
shall establish offenses which may be 
punished in different ways under different 
provisions of the code, the act shall be 
punishable under only one such provision; an 
acquittal or conviction and sentence under 
any such provision bars a prosecution under 
any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish 
separate offenses under a single criminal 
episode, unless the court otherwise orders to 
promote justice, a defendant shall not be 
subject to separate trials for multiple 
offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the 
jurisdiction of a single court, and 
(b) The offenses are known to the 
prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first 
information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an 
offense included in the offense charged but 
may not be convicted of both the offense 
charged and the included offense. An offense 
is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the 
same or less than all the facts required 
to establish the commission of the offense 
charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, 
solicitation, conspiracy, or form of 
preparation to commit the offense charged 
or an offense otherwise included therein; 
or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a 
statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to 
charge the jury with respect to an included 
offense unless there is a rational basis for 
a verdict acquitting the defendant of the 
offense charged and convicting him of the 
included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after 
verdict or judgment, or an appellate court on 
appeal or certiorari, shall determine that 
there is insufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for the offense charged but that 
there is sufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for an included offense and the 
trier of fact necessarily found every fact 
required for conviction of the included 
offense, the verdict or judgment of 
conviction may be set aside or reversed and a 
judgment of conviction entered for the 
included offense, without necessity of a new 
trial, if such relief is sought by the 
defendant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Harvey Dorton, was originally charged with 
attempted second degree murder, aggravated burglary, aggravated 
kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and aggravated sexual assault. 
After a preliminary hearing, the attempted murder charge against 
him was dismissed. The matter was tried before a jury on January 
18 and 19, 1982, in Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, before the Honorable Bryant N. Croft, Judge. The 
aggravated sexual assault charge was dismissed on motion of the 
defense at the close of the state's case. The jury returned a 
verdict of guilty of aggravated burglary, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-6-203 (1978); aggravated robbery, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-302 (1978) and aggravated kidnapping, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-302 (1978). Defendant was 
sentenced to three concurrent terms of five years to life. He 
appealed from the convictions and the judgment was affirmed. 
State v. Dorton, No. 18667, slip op. (Utah Oct. 26, 1983). 
Defendant was also convicted of bail jumping as a 
result of his failure to appear for the second day of trial while 
released on bail in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-312 (1978) 
and was sentenced to up to five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The conviction was appealed, and was affirmed in State v. Dorton, 
696 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1985). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On December 23, 1980f at approximately 7:00 p.m., two 
men wearing ski masks and armed with a sawed-off shotgun and 
pistol entered the home of John and Betty Thomas in Murray, Utah, 
without permission (R. 443, 491). The taller of the two men was 
later identified as defendant (R. 462, 481, 502, 522-525, 533, 
547-548). The other was later identified at Ronald Leroy Hall. 
At the time of the illegal entry, John and Betty were 
not home; Garn Edwards, Betty's stepfather, was in the home 
tending his two young grandsons, Johnny Thomas and Chancey 
Pellum. No one else was home. Betty Thomas, Johnny's mother, 
and Barbara Pellum, Chancey's mother, had gone out to do some 
last-minute Christmas shopping. (R. 442-489, 519, 527.) 
The two men entered the house through the kitchen door, 
confronted Mr. Edwards and the boys, and demanded to know if John 
Thomas was home. Mr. Edwards told them he was not. They said 
they were there to get some money. To show that they were 
serious, one of the men fired a shot and then defendant struck 
Mr. Edwards on the side of the head with the pistol. (R. 444-45, 
520.) Defendant compelled Mr. Edwards to go upstairs with him to 
look for jewelry; they found none. Defendant then took all the 
money Mr. Edwards had on his person. (R. 446-47.) 
A few hours later, Betty Thomas returned home. The two 
men accosted her as she entered the house and demanded that she 
give them her jewelry. She gave them two rings and some chains 
and bracelets. (R. 450-51, 490, 499.) Mrs. Thomas gave her son 
Johnny some medicine for his strep throat; he was soon asleep. 
The shorter man, Hall, accompanied Mrs. Thomas upstairs as she 
went to prepare her little boy's bed. (R. 452, 292, 493.) In 
the bedroom, Hall forced her to disrobe and lean over the end of 
the bed. He then forced Mrs. Thomas to engage in anal sodomy and 
sexual intercourse. (R. 494.) After Hall and Mrs. Thomas had 
dressed and gone back downstairs, he took her alone into the 
dining room where he forced her to engaged in oral sodomy and, 
again, sexual intercourse. (R. 495-496.) 
At about 11 p.m., Barbara Pellum drove up to the house 
(R. 454-496, 528-29). She was accompanied in the car with her 
children Kimberly and Kevin and her brother Grant Davis. Mrs. 
Pellum went into the house to get her son Chancey to take him 
home. Defendant opened the door and was holding a sawed-off 
shotgun. (R. 454, 528-29.) Mrs. Thomas, Gam Edwards, and 
Chancey Pellum all had their hands tied (R. 452-453, 496). The 
men threatened to kill all of them if they did not cooperate and 
then told Mrs. Pellum that they had been paid $5,000 to kill John 
Thomas. (R. 530.) Later, Mrs. Pellum overheard the two men 
arguing between themselves, saying, "Let's just kill Betty. We 
will get $2,000 for killing her. Let's kill her and get the job 
done and get out of here." (R. 530.) During the time Mrs. 
Pellum was in the house, the men fired several shots, one of 
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which hit the television, shattering the tube. (R. 455-56, 498, 
529.) 
Defendant demanded a cigarette. Mrs. Pellum said she 
had some in the car. Defendant took her out to the car at 
gunpoint to get the cigarettes. (R. 454, 497, 530-31.) When 
they came back in the house with the cigarettes, Hall became 
agitated because the people left in the car had been left 
unguarded and might contact the police. Defendant went out again 
and brought Grant Davis and Kevin Taylor into the house. Mrs. 
Pellum's daughter Kimberly had already left. (R. 457, 497, 532.) 
After taking Mr. Davis's money and money clip, the two men had 
all of them lie down on floor and count to 100. Defendant and 
Hall then left. (R. 458-59, 498, 533.) 
Betty Thomas stated that the taller of the two men wore 
an unusual spoon-type ring (R. 500-01). Defendant was arrested 
on January 2, 1981, wearing a spoon-type ring (R. 330, 518). 
Mrs. Pellum saw defendant's face when he raised the ski mask to 
smoke his cigarette (R. 533). 
Defendant was tried by jury before the Honorable Bryant 
H. Croft on January 18 and 19, 1982. He was present for the 
first day of trial but failed to appear for the second day, and 
the trial proceeded in this absence. He was convicted of 
aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and aggravated 
kidnapping. (R. 282, 312-25, 333.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The order denying defendant's untimely motion to set 
aside the judgment was not an order affecting his substantial 
rights; this Court may, therefore, wish to decline to review the 
merits of this appeal. 
Regardless, on the facts of this case, defendant's 
convictions for aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and 
aggravated kidnapping were based on separate acts involving 
multiple victims, and were not the result of one act during a 
single criminal episode. Further, the crimes charged are not 
lesser-included offenses of one another. Specifically, 
aggravated kidnapping is not a lesser-included offense of 
aggravated robbery, and aggravated robbery is not a lesser-
included offense of aggravated kidnapping. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S MOTION, FROM WHICH THIS 
APPEAL WAS TAKEN, WAS OUT OF TIME, THIS COURT 
MAY WISH TO DECLINE REVIEW ON THE MERITS. 
Defendant was convicted by a jury in January 1982, of 
aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and aggravated 
kidnapping. He appealed from his convictions, claiming he was 
entitled to a new trial because of a defect in the information 
and an error in a jury instruction. The Supreme Court affirmed. 
State v. Dorton, No. 18667, slip op. (Utah Oct. 26, 1983).1 
Defendant did not claim at trial that his convictions were 
inappropriate because they were committed during a single 
criminal episode or because they were lesser included offenses of 
Defendant was also convicted in a separate proceeding of bail 
jumping in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-312 (1978); he 
appealed and his conviction was affirmed at State v. Dorton, 686 
P.2d 1218 (Utah 1985). 
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one another, and he did not raise the issue in his initial 
appeal. 
On July 11, 1988, defendant filed a pro se Motion to 
Set Aside Sentence, Judgment and Commitment (R. 674). Lynn Brown 
was appointed to represent him on August 24, 1988 (R. 690). The 
State, represented by Ralph D. Crockett, Deputy Salt Lake County 
Attorney, opposed the motion (R. 691). The motion was heard and 
denied on September 26, 1988, by the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, 
Judge (R. 714, 719). Defendant now appeals the denial of his 
motion and claims that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion because he could not be convicted of separate offenses 
arising out of a single criminal episode or of multiple offenses 
which are lesser included offenses of one another. 
Defendant's jurisdictional bases in this Court is that 
the order was a final order affecting his substantial rights 
under Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(b). The Utah appellate courts 
have not defined what constitutes a final order affecting 
substantial rights. In Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140 (Utah 
1982), the court stated that the final judgment rule does not 
preclude review of all postjudgment orders. The order may be 
reviewable depending upon its substance and effect. While the 
case was decided under former Utah R. Civ. P. 72(a), which has 
been superseded by the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court and the 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, the court indicated that an 
appellate court should look to the substance of a postjudgment 
order to determine whether it is appealable. 
While the Utah appellate courts have not decided what 
constitutes a final order affecting the "substantial rights" of 
an appellant under the new rules, it appears that in this case, 
the order of the district court from which defendant appeals did 
not affect his substantial rights. The order denied a frivolous 
motion, as set forth in point II. Further, appellate review is 
not appropriate for other reasons. First, defendant waived his 
claim by not timely preserving this issue for appeal in the trial 
court. Second, defendant has already had one direct appeal from 
his convictions in which he should have, if the claims were not 
waived, raised the issue he now raises. Third, if the trial 
court erred, and defendant has suffered a substantial denial of a 
constitutional right, his remedy is not direct review but, 
rather, a collateral proceeding under Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(i), so 
long as the claim has not been previously adjudged. 
Other courts that have considered the issue of untimely 
appellate review under similar circumstances have ruled that an 
appellant in defendant's position is not entitled to a review of 
the merits of his claim. In People v. Cantrell, 170 Cal.App.2d 
40, 16 Cal. Rptr. 905, (1961), cert, denied, 371 U.S. 853 (1962), 
the defendant's direct appeal from his arson conviction was 
dismissed for failure to timely file a brief. Over six years 
later, he filed a motion for modification of judgment; the motion 
was denied and he appealed. The court of appeals dismissed the 
appeal, finding that the motion upon which it was based was 
unauthorized. The defendant's "substantial rights" were not 
affected and the matters could have been reviewed on timely 
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appeal. To rule otherwise would have allowed the defendant two 
appeals or could have the effect of indefinitely extending the 
time in which to appeal. 
In the present case, defendant's untimely motion, 
couched as a motion to set aside sentence, judgment and 
conviction, was not provided for by the Utah Rules of Criminal 
2 
Procedure. It consequently should have been dismissed on 
procedural grounds because it was out of time. Regardless, it 
does not appear to be an order affecting the substantial rights 
of the defendant which would entitle him to appellate review. 
For these reasons, this Court may wish to summarily affirm the 
trial court's order without reaching the merits. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S THREE CONVICTIONS WERE PROPER AND 
ARE NOT BARRED BECAUSE THE ACTS OF DEFENDANT 
OCCURRED DURING A SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE OR 
BECAUSE TWO CONVICTIONS ARE LESSER-INCLUDED 
OFFENSES OF ONE CONVICTION. 
Defendant contends that aggravated kidnapping is a 
lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery since a person must 
be detained or restrained to be robbed. His contention that 
aggravated kidnapping is a lesser-included offense of aggravated 
robbery because detainment or restraint is inherent in a robbery 
can be summarily disposed of. In State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89 
Rule 12 provides for various pretrial motions; motions related 
to defects in the information, etc., must be made five days prior 
to trial. A motion for arrest of judgment pursuant to Rule 23 
(which provides for motions similar in substance to defendant's 
motion in this case) must be made prior to imposition of 
sentence. A motion for new trial pursuant to Rule 24 must be 
made within ten days of imposition of sentence, unless otherwise 
ordered prior to the expiration of the ten days. 
(Utah 1981), the Supreme Court stated that a literal application 
of the kidnapping statute could transform virtually every robbery 
into a kidnapping as well. The Court held that to support a 
kidnapping charge, the detention must be for a substantial period 
and "requires a period of detention longer than the minimum 
inherent in the commission of a rape or robbery." Icl. at 93. If 
the kidnapping is not "merely incidental or subsidiary to some 
other crime," it is separately punishable for the kidnapping 
itself, ^d. In this case, the victims were detained over four 
hours—certainly a substantial period and a period longer than 
the amount of time inherently necessary to commit a robbery. 
The second aspect of defendant's argument is likewise 
without merit. He contends that because aggravated burglary was 
charged as requiring the state to prove that he entered a 
dwelling with the intent to commit a "theft, assault or felony," 
and the facts here established that he entered with the intent to 
commit a "felony," aggravated robbery is a lesser-included 
offense of aggravated burglary. Defendant's argument is not 
supported by reference to specific facts or legal principles to 
establish his position. He correctly points out that to 
determine whether a lesser-included offense situation exists, the 
court must apply, under some circumstances, both a principle and 
secondary test. The principle test requires an analysis of the 
statutory elements of each crime. An offense is a lesser-
included offense when it is established by proof of the same or 
less than all of the facts required to establish the commission 
of the offense charged. The secondary test only becomes relevant 
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when a crime charged has multiple variations; that is, the test 
must be applied to determine whether the greater-lesser 
relationship exists between the specific variations of the crimes 
actually proved at trial. For example, under some circumstances, 
but not all, theft is a lesser-included offense of aggravated 
robbery. Specifically, aggravated robbery may be proved in any 
one of three ways—when a weapon is used during an attempt to 
commit, during the commission of, or in the immediate flight 
after the attempt or commission of the robbery. When a weapon is 
used during the actual commission of a robbery, theft is 
necessarily a lesser-included offense. However, it is not a 
lesser-included offense of the other variations of aggravated 
robbery. State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983). 
Applying the principle test articulated by the Supreme 
Court in Hill— that is, comparing the elements of the crimes to 
determine if one is proved by proof of the same or less than all 
of the facts required to establish the commission of the greater 
offense charged—it is obvious that aggravated kidnapping is not 
a lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery, and that 
aggravated robbery is not a lesser-included offense of aggravated 
burglary, as defendant contends. The elements are, at a minimum, 
not sufficiently similar or overlapping to bring the lesser-
included offense doctrine into consideration. The secondary 
aspect of the Hill test is, in this case, inaposite. 
The statutory elements of aggravated burglary, aggravated 
robbery, and aggravated kidnapping are set forth in this brief at 
pages 2-4. 
In State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1987), cert. 
denied, 108 S.Ct. 1597 (1988), the defendant was convicted of 
aggravated robbery of the store clerk, theft, and aggravated 
assault of a person who interrupted the robbery. He argued on 
appeal that the aggravated assault and theft were lesser-included 
offenses of the aggravated robbery. The Supreme Court summarily 
rejected his argument that the aggravated assault was a lesser-
included offense of the aggravated robbery, stating that the 
aggravated robbery and aggravated assault were simply two 
offenses committed within the same criminal episode and the 
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crimes required proof by different evidence. I^d* a t H91. 
Finally, defendant's convictions are not precluded by 
the concept that they were committed during a single criminal 
episode. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) provides: 
A defendant may be prosecuted in a single 
criminal action for all separate offenses 
arising out of a single criminal episode; 
however, when the same act of a defendant 
under a single criminal episode shall 
establish offenses which may be punished in 
different ways under different provisions of 
this code, the act shall be punishable under 
only one such provision; an acquittal or 
conviction and sentence under any such 
provision bars a prosecution under any other 
such provision. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Defendant's three convictions are not barred by this 
provision because his convictions were not the result of the 
"same act" punished in more than one way, but were rather 
4 
Applying the secondary aspect of the Hill analysis, the Court 
found that theft was a lesser-included offense of aggravated 
robbery on the facts of case. 
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separate and distinct acts. Branch, 743 P.2d at 1191. Defendant 
and co-defendant Hall forced their way into the home of Betty and 
John Thomas while armed with a pistol and a sawed-off shotgun; 
their expressed intent was to murder John Thomas. During the 
course of the next four hours, defendant and Hall beat Betty's 
stepfather over the head with a gun, and defendant forcibly took 
the stepfather's money. When Betty got home, she was beaten, 
raped and sodomized by Hall. She was also robbed of her jewelry 
and money from her purse. In the end, defendant and Hall held 
seven people captive. This, alone, was sufficient to result in 
seven counts of aggravated kidnapping. In State v. James, 631 
P.2d 854, 855 (Utah 1981), the Supreme Court stated that "[i]n 
crimes against the person . . . a single criminal act or episode 
may constitute as many offenses as there are victims." In James, 
the defendant was convicted of five counts of kidnapping, one 
count for each victim; the court found the convictions to be 
appropriate and looked to the statute, which speaks in terms of 
the singular victim. See also State v. Eichler, 584 P.2d 861 
(Utah 1978) (aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping 
convictions which arise from the same criminal episode were not 
barred as they were not the same act of the defendant). 
If this Court reaches the merits of defendant's claims, 
it is clear that defendant was not "over-charged" or "over-
convicted. " If anything, his multiple acts against multiple 
victims could and should have resulted in additional charges and 
convictions. Defendant's crimes, although committed during one 
four-hour criminal episode, were separate acts done as the result 
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of intentional conduct. An examination of the elements of the 
crimes establish that aggravated kidnapping is not a lesser-
included offense of aggravated robbery, and that aggravated 
robbery is not a lesser-included offense of aggravated burglary. 
His convictions, therefore, are not barred because they were a 
single act during a single criminal episode or because they are 
lesser-included offenses of one another. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant, Harvey Dorton, was properly convicted of 
aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and aggravated 
kidnapping. For the foregoing reasons, and any additional 
reasons advanced at oral argument, the State of Utah respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm defendant's convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this day of August, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Utah Attorney General 
BARA BEA^SON 
sistant Attorney General 
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